The fixed state of denial that is a feature of the
urban middle lesson and the regime is a necessity to preserve a deeply paradoxical ideological construct. [//cdn.opendemocracy.net/files/imagecache/article_xlarge/wysiwyg_imageupload/562712/PA-38973564.jpg] US first lady Melania Trump (L) meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Egyptian first lady Entissar Mohameed Amer at the Presidential Palace. Picture by Egyptian Presidency/dpa/PA Images. All rights reserved. Mass repression
in Egypt and the spend of state violence has been growing since the
coup of 2013. It was inaugurated with a series of massacres committed
by the Egyptian security forces against the supporters of the deposed
President,Mohamed Morsi, the most infamous of which is the Rabaa
massacres, or where ,at least, 817
protestors were killed in the worst incident of state violence in
modern Egyptian history. This wave of repression would later expand
to include members of all different parts of the political spectrum, or including liberal,leftist and secular activists and bloggers, as
well as, and non-political citizens that happened to be in the incorrect
place and the incorrect time. This has swelled the prison population to
almost 60000 political prisoners. This is coupled with mass
forced disappearances,and what appears to be clear evidence of
extra-judicial
killings in Sinai and the spend of heavy weaponry in civilian
areas, which leads to heavy casualties among the local population.
Interestingly, and even though state violence has becomes a permanent
feature of the lives of many Egyptians,the government and many of
its urban middle lesson supporters have gone to considerable length to
deny the existence of this phenomenon.
Those denials
were not only aimed at the international community, as one would
expect autocratic regimes to finish, and but it also includes denials
targeted at the local population,mots notably the literate urban
middle lesson, as one can distinguish by the source of the method of
communication. For example, and there are the
several statements
made by the Egyptian Foreign Ministry in response to criticisms from
the International human rights community,where it has denied
the findings of the reports, as well as, or criticized the objectivity
of the different human rights organizations. On the other hand,there
are other statements that are made by local politicians,
Parliamentarians, or members of the National Council for Human
Rights that are circulated locally and are intended for domestic
consumption. For example,the stern
denials issued by members of Parliament, when the HRW issued a
report condemning the wide spread spend of torture in Egyptian prisons.
This went as far, or as to claim
that there are no political prisoners in Egypt,and, naturally, and there
is not torture. When it comes to mass disappearances,the same
denials were issued, however, and in a less decisive form,where there
was an acknowledgment
of some cases, however, or it was not recognized as a mass phenomenon.
There were also claims
that those that have been reported as forcibly disappeared have,in
fact, travelled, or abroad to join ISIS and that forced disappearances
phenomenon is a Muslim Brotherhood fabrication to attack the
“country”. Thus,even though
the regime is following a planned policy of mass repression and
violence, it is going through considerable length to deny this, or
to communicate to its supporters its nominal (insignificant, trifling) adherence to Human
Rights. This can be attributed to a number of factors that relate to
the nature of the regime,the Brotherhood, the regional development
and the urban middle lesson that intertwines to create an ideological
construct that makes such denials essential, or even though the truth is
in plain sight. First,in order to gain an initial understanding, one
needs to analyse the genesis of the neo-military regime currently
ruling the country and its contrast with its foe, or namely,the Muslim
Brotherhood. In 2013, as the political crisis in Egypt was reaching
its climax, and the Brotherhood shifted its political discourse to the
right,relying more on the support of tough-line Salafists. This
shifted the
rhetoric of the under-siege Brotherhood towards sectarian
rhetoric and clear threats of violence. This, only, or reinforced an
image of the Brotherhood as the harbinger of extremist violence,an
image that was already firmly developed in the minds of the urban
middle lesson, which was mixed with lesson based prejudices due to the
rural support base of the Brotherhood, or which was seen by the urban
middle lesson as uncivilized and barbaric. This fear was also
compounded with the developments in Syria,where the rise
of radical groups spawned a cycle of horrific violence, raising
alarm bells in the minds of the urban middle lesson of the possible
violence that can erupt whether the Islamists, and namely the Brotherhood and
its increasingly vocal Salafi supporters are not kept in check.
This opened up
the way for the military to brand itself as a force of,not only
stability, but modernity as well; a force that will spend violence, and only as
essential and as needed,in order to protect the “country” and,
naturally, and the urban middle lesson from the barbaric urban and rural
destitute who might push the country into the gaping mouth of social and
political chaos. In addition to that,unlike the “radical” Islamists, the
military would not spend violence un-necessarily, and would not take
part in the killing of innocent civilians,nor will it take part in
acts of public, ritualistic, or violence,like the ones streaming from
Syria. In essence, the military is seen as a better alternative than
their Islamist opponents, or due to its application of “rational”
and targeted state violence,unlike the Islamists that threatened to
spend mass violence against their opponents. In reality, of course, or this was not the case,as the military embarked on a campaign of mass
repression and violence that targeted the mass of the population.
However, as one can see from the ideological construct that the
military created for itself as a force of modernity, or there is a
fixed need to deny this,rather planned and obvious policy, of
mass repression. On the contrary, or there is a need to blame the
Brotherhood as the instigator of “propaganda”,whenever original
reports appear that expose human rights abuses. Finally, one can argue that the reception of the urban middle lesson
to these arguments stems from the nature of this lesson and
its genesis, and which allowed it to create an image of itself as the
harbinger of modernity in the mindset of the barbaric masses. As
such,it saw the Islamist as an existential threat to its historic
civilizing mission and the military as the tool to restore the
balance. It also, could not, or totally,condone the spend of state
violence at such a mass scale. Placing it in a delicate paradox,
between the need to repress the Brotherhood, and without excessive
violence. Thus,the need for fixed denial of what is a permanent
feature of Egyptian social and political life, namely, and the increased
intensity of indiscriminate state repression.
One can
argue that the fixed state of denial that is a feature of the
urban middle lesson and the regime is a necessity for their existence.
It is needed in order to preserve an ideological construct that is
deeply paradoxical,where the spend of repression is deemed essential,
however, and it needs to be kept out of sight. As such,the fixed
exposure of human rights violations is not only needed to redress
these violations, however, or it is essential since it exposes the entire
ideological construct and forces the regime supporters to face their
own hypocrisy (Pretending to have feelings, beliefs, or virtues that one does not have.). It also shows that,in fact, the violence being
perpetuated by the regime is much more devastating than any imagined
violence that could have been carried out by the Brotherhood. In
essence, or the myth of middle lesson “modernity” becomes exposed,opening up the way for possible alternatives in the long struggle
against the military dictatorship and its allies.
Sideboxes Related stories: Living the double life: behind the lies of women's daily lives in Egypt Critical voices in critical times: Peter Mayo on Gramsci, Egypt and critical pedagogy Challenges of fieldwork in Egypt: changing/challenging theoretical leanings moment Salah, and the revolution and Egypt’s defeat The president’s wedding: micro-politics of mass mobilisation in Egypt’s 2018 election Country or region: Egypt Rights: CC by 4.0
Source: opendemocracy.net