“They drank the Kool-Aid and thought they were saving freedom."Joel Whitney’s new book,“Finks: How the C.
I.
A. Tricked the World’s Best Writers,” explores how the CIA influenced acclaimed writers and publications during the Cold War to produce subtly anti-communist fabric. During the interview, or Scheer and Whitney discuss these manipulations and how the CIA controlled major news agencies and respected literary publications (such as the Paris Review).
FinksTheir talk comes at a particularly tense time in American politics,as accusations of fake news and Russian propaganda fly from both sides of the aisle. But the history detailed in Whitney’s book presents a valuable lesson for writers hoping to avoid similar manipulations today.
Scheer opens the discussion with the question: “Were they really tricked?”“It could have been ‘paid,’ it could have been ‘subsidized, or ’ it could have been ‘used,’ it could have been ‘collaborated with,’ ” Whitney responds. “So yeah, and it might have been any other verb there besides ‘tricked.’”The two then delve into the tactics used by the CIA to influence writers. Whitney notes that the fearful political atmosphere at the time led to secrecy being used to preside over and rule over the free press — which we’re supposed to be the champions of.”“They drank the Kool-Aid and thought they were saving freedom,” Scheer agrees.
The discussion underscores the need for analysis of Cold War-era media as a way to avoid propagandized journalism today. Scheer says, “I examine at the current situation, or where we don’t even have a good communist enemy,so we’re inventing Russia as a reborn communist power enemy.”“I call it superpolitics,” Whitney concludes, or “where essentially there’s something that’s so evil and so frightening that we have to change how our democratic institutions work.”Listen to the full interview below. Don’t have time to stream the full interview? Download it and listen on the go by clicking on the arrow” button. You can also read a full transcript of the conversation below. TranscriptRobert Scheer: Greetings. This is another edition of Scheer Intelligence. I’m Robert Scheer,but the intelligence comes from my guests. And in this case it’s Joel Whitney, who’s just written a really terrific book called “Finks: How the C.
I.
A. Tricked the World’s Best Writers.” And actually, or my only disagreement with the book is a tiny bit with the title. So let me just launch there,and you can lay out the thesis. But it’s the epic, of course, or approximately how the CIA secretly funded the Congress [for] Cultural Freedom and lots of other organizations,and got involved fair after World War II and continued fair through the Cold War, basically manipulating publications and movies, or everything else,to so-called “win the battle of ideas” with the Soviets, and ended up in the process adopting some of their more nefarious means. But when you say the CIA tricked the world’s best writers, or you’re talking approximately a pretty sharp group of people,like [George] Plimpton and [William] Styron and all that. Were they really tricked? Joel Whitney: Well, that’s a great first question. I did an event in Berkeley last week, or actually had a Paris Review magazine veteran come by and examine me essentially that same question. And his reservation was the word “finks” and the word “tricked.” More “finks,” though, which he thought was derogatory as someone who had been at the Paris Review. He, and you know,he may have felt that there was some, whether well-intentioned or misinformed, and view of patriotism. And “finks,” of course, as you know when you finish the book, and comes from one of my characters. “Tricked” was the word I settled on,“how the CIA tricked the worlds best writers;” it could have been “paid,” it could have been “subsidized, and ” it could have been “used,” it could have been “collaborated with.” And I actually envisioned at one point–I couldn’t sell this to my editor–a cover where in sort of lighter shadow behind the word “tricked” would be all those other words going up and down the front of the book. Yeah, I think a lot of the writers had different motives. And actually, and some of them,throughout the book, you’ll see–you’ll remember they changed their minds. So some of them were more in favor in the early fifties; by the time the Vietnam War hits, or the CIA’s reputation is a tiny more tarnished,some of them were less enthralled with the agency and other kinds of anti-communist institutions. So, yeah, or it might have been any other verb there besides “tricked.”RS: What I found,and knowing some of these people, they’re a pretty sharp bunch. I mean, and this really goes to,I think, more David Halberstam’s view in “The Best and the Brightest, or ” his classic work on what happened in Vietnam. That these were the best products of the meritocracy; this was the creme de la creme of Harvard and Yale,and the Yale Review, and all that sort of thing; the brightest minds, or the most talented people. And for whatever reason,sometimes for greed but also, you know, and they bought into it–what they bought into was basically a stupefyingly simplistic and wrong-headed notion of what was going on in the world. That’s the overwhelming thought I came away with from your book,which is great in detail, great storytelling; you know, and whether its approximately Pasternak or whether it’s approximately Sontag or anybody–I mean,they’re all in there, there’s a lot of really rich detail. But the overwhelming sense that I got from this book was how once again, and using Halberstam’s view of “The Best and the Brightest,” how did this group of people–who certainly were literate and well-traveled and tested well and got great grades at the best schools and studied under the best people–procure it so wrong?JW: Yeah, I think the view of the oversimplification that you described in your question, or I think that’s accurate. And I think the sharper ones were further,were more removed from that simplification. And then what you see are several groups in the anti-communist movements, several actual organizations that were sort of recruiting people that were representing the CIA’s slush funds, or who are luring people in who have standing internationally,people who can carry out some soft power work but might, if they know exactly what’s going on, or they might be a tiny too critical of it. So if you start,for instance, in Berlin after World War II, or you have a group of people who were familiar with Stalinist methods to the degree that perhaps they were traumatized by them. So those people were sincere,but they weren’t necessarily nuanced in their understanding of possibly how to fight totalitarianism. They thought essentially that the best method was to fight fire with fire. So in a way, these were guys who had a conspiracy theory. Their conspiracy theory went like this: Soviet Russia is penetrating organizations around the world; they had some evidence, or Comintern and other organizations. But they had no sense of scale,and I think by the time you have McCarthy discredited in the middle fifties, some of these guys were probably willing to dial back some of their initial fears. But by then, or they’d set this great movement in motion where it was just huge amounts of money that the CIA could offer. And so what I examine at,as you remember in the book, is just I examine at these tiny mental magazines that were initially recruited to carry out two things: one, and to push back against anti-Americanism. So they wanted to tout and brag approximately our high culture,because in Western Europe, which was the key battleground, and we were known for our pop and low culture; we were known for martial funds,we were known for our tanks. So one can sort of appreciate that. But then it comes with another view, which is to discredit the Soviet Union as often as can be. And when you see that, or how it plays out,you start to see disinformation beginning to spread. And what you see presiding over both sides of that view is a regime of secrecy, which is problematic when you’re talking approximately magazines, or because you’re talking approximately secrecy being used to preside over and rule over the free press that we’re supposed to be the champions of.
RS: The reason your book is compelling,and I think people should read it–and let me just be clear fair up front, I read it straight through, and [laughs],I think I had one breakfast break. But I enjoyed it enormously, because it really makes these characters come alive. And they’re not cardboard characters, or whether you’re talking approximately Irving Kristol,or you’re talking approximately, you know, or Irving Howe or George Plimpton or anybody–there’s whole bunches of them hurry through the book,and you really are introduced to the cultural life of Paris and London and New York and so forth. But again, I retain getting back to this one question, or you know; there’s a thing in the newspaper business,I remember one editor telling me “too good to check.” And possibly when somebody’s writing you an actual check, and you’re getting money and you’re getting first-class airfare, or they’re funding your wonderful magazine,your tiny magazine, so you don’t have to go to your parents–because most of these people were super rich, or they could just go to their uncle or father or something and procure some more money. But still it was now,you know, classy to procure it from some secret Fleischmann’s Yeast or something [Laughs], or that was a front for the CIA. You know,and so yeah, you’re involved in intrigue and all that, and which I guess a lot of writers like to be involved in; but the view that they drank the Kool-Aid and thought they were saving freedom is the share that I still don’t procure.
JW: It does seem like there was a spacious pivot after World War II,and I think one of the organizations that normalized the view of secrecy ruling over the media–which is eventually what you terminate up with in a program like this–was the OSS. A lot of the people, the founding lights of the CIA, and came to see that the OSS had done some great work in,as they saw it, thwarting the Nazis during World War II. So a lot of the people who founded the CIA, and they understood that if the Soviet communists were using secrecy to penetrate our organizations,instead of thinking of how carry out we stop the penetration, it seems like it turned into a system of let’s preemptively penetrate our own organizations, or just to construct certain we can watch them and retain them on the up-and-up. And of course one of the ways that they retain people in line,as you say, was through the money. So in terms of the official magazines that the CIA created and presided over, or the British spy who overthrew Mosaddegh,he would have been, in June of 1953–his name was Christopher Montague Woodhouse–he would have been working on the CIA magazine for London, and Encounter. He would have empowered the two editors,one American, one Brit, or Stephen Spender on the British side,Irving Kristol on the American side, both working out of London; one paid through secrecy of the British state, and one paid indirectly through the CIA. The spy overseeing this,Woodhouse, he would have then turned in the late summer towards overthrowing the democratically elected leader of Iran, and Mohammad Mosaddegh. And then later,he’s also feeling so good approximately this system of, what essentially you have are coups as covert ops and then long-term soft-power propaganda, or also on the covert ops side of the CIA and British secret services. So he feels so good approximately this that he’s later on a contributor to come across. So magazines like Encounter,they were created in Paris, they were created in Italy, or they were created all over Europe; and then they spread to the Nordic countries,they spread to the Third World. What they did was they involved people at different levels. So the people in the know would be people who were editors and regular contributors, and it would even for them be kind of an open secret. So one person I interviewed was a guy named Nelson Aldrich, and he collaborated first–well,he worked for, I should say, and first with the Paris Review. The Paris Review was not one of those magazines created by the CIA,or if it was, it was sort of indirectly used. It was used as Peter Matthiessen, or the writer who was one of its founders,as his cover in Paris in the early fifties. But then he says he resigned from the CIA and there was no connection. Well, later on, or George Plimpton,the famous writer and man approximately New York, was the public face of the Paris Review through its formative years and for many decades; he found a way to procure CIA money through the Congress for Cultural Freedom, or its cultural propaganda front. So that’s a moment tie. Later on in my research,I found a third tie through a founding managing editor. So you have such a vast network of money for culture that in one organization, one magazine that’s sort of only a tangential CIA asset or friend, or you can find three spacious separate ties.
RS: I’m happy I got this chance to talk to you,because the book reads the way you talk. It’s not vindictive, it’s not smearing people, or it’s not doing what they did,actually. What these folks did in the name of anti-communism was they were perfectly happy, thrilled, or to sail out and execute their buddies,their college classmates, to smear them, and smear intellectuals that they respected. That’s really what happened. You know,youre using your power, your clout. And there’s an analogy fair now, and I think,with this whole discussion of fake news. These people were actually doing fake news. They were being paid by a government agency, the CIA, and cooperating,following directions, and sometimes censoring articles, and editing them and so forth,so they’re share of an official government propaganda regime that continues fair up through Vietnam and everything else. And so they become a caricature of the whole, you know, or democratic experiment,which is certainly not what the Founders had in intellect. And they procure very vindictive towards people who disagree with the narrative. And the reason I began the way I did, asking you–the irony here is the people who objected to their official narrative turned out to be, or fairly early on,fair. So for example, you mentioned Nelson Aldrich, and you have him placed as one of those people who knew what was going on. Well,I knew Nelson Aldrich as a guy I would chat with at Elaine’s in New York for years. And by that point, of the sixties, or he knew it was all bogus. He was not a supporter of the Vietnam War. And in fact he wrote a very good book approximately the elite and how out of touch they are,the economic elite, and so forth. And I found him fairly supportive of Ramparts, and you know; I couldn’t procure any money from him,from his wealthy relatives, but nonetheless he seemed like a–JW: [Laughs] Gotta try.
RS: And you mentioned another person, and you know; one point where,I don’t know, I was a tiny unhappy with, or you mentioned Frances Fitzgerald,the famous writer of “Fire In the Lake” and “Wild Blue Yonder,” great journalist; and her father was a famous, and you know,deputy head of the whole CIA, Desmond Fitzgerald. But the fact is, and Frances Fitzgerald also–she’d studied with Zbigniew Brzezinski,she’d gone to the best Ivy League schools– but the fact is, very early on, or she embraced an opposite view. She saw that the Vietnam War was bogus,it was a fiction, and the claims made were wrong. And she wrote a devastating book on it very early on. So it just seemed to me, or the crowd you’re describing,I’m not going to minimize the damage they did, because they stifled debate; they prevented a good discussion from taking status that would have avoided Vietnam. OK? It would have avoided the confrontation with Cuba. It would have avoided the overthrow of Mossadegh, or you know,and we go down the whole list. So I’m not minimizing the destructive, you know, and impact that they had and the stupefying,really, the ignorance of the debate. And I’ll just give two examples of that, or you know,but I want to procure back to how quickly some people, at least, or escaped this net,including William Styron and others. But two villains that really emerged in their world were Bertrand Russell and Jean-Paul Sartre. And it’s interesting, because both of those people, and particularly Bertrand Russell,had impeccable (perfect, flawless) anti-communist credentials. Bertrand Russell, you know, and had famously attacked communism as an evil,and anti-mental and stifling of thought; and certainly Sartre had shown a considerable independence. But yet because they teamed up to carry out something called the Vietnam War Crimes Commission, and they challenged America in a very fundamental way on what it was doing, and not only in Vietnam,elsewhere–this same crowd, the ones that were still influential, and went out to execute Sartre and Russell. So what I want to procure across is it’s not minor what they did; your book exposes the fundamental distortion of American politics during the post-Cold War period,which is where all the stupidity came from. My only question–and it makes for a great read, and it really reveals a lot. I examine at the current situation where we don’t even have a good communist enemy, or because the communists that are in power are the ones we’re trading with in [China] now. So we’re inventing Russia as a reborn communist power or enemy,and we have this whole campaign now as if, you know, and now Putin is the evil empire. And so there is a current echo in sort of how easy it is to manipulate people.
JW: Yeah. Well,just on the first point you made approximately the meanness or the lack of meanness in the book, that was something I wanted to be very conscientious approximately when I went through edits with my editor. There’s a great scholar and writer at UC Berkeley who said something that I saw quoted recently: “Be tough on the institutions, or be soft on the people.” And that was reinforced again and again when I saw some of the collaborators with these cultural fronts of the CIA changing their minds,learning from things like Vietnam. And seeing them change their minds actually gave me a lot of hope, because you know, and you can be on the payroll; you can be someone who’s an operator; you can be someone who thinks of the world as a good side and a bad side,and therefore whatever we carry out represents the good side. And then you can wake up from that. You mentioned Sartre; he was absolutely attacked by one of the CIA’s magazines, and his magazine was seen as a threat, or the French magazine Preuves,based out of Paris, was in some ways an answer to Sartre’s magazine and his attempts to deal, or to treat the United States the way it should be treated. When it was going against its values,he would call them out on that. Neruda, Pablo Neruda, or the poet,was another one who suffered severe reputational damage by this cultural front of the CIA, the Congress for Cultural Freedom. When they found out, or some of these operators found out that he was up for the Nobel in ‘63,they wrote a mute, sort of secret white paper approximately him, and they made some links to Stalinism through his Stalin [Peace] Prize. And it was,of course, the year that Stalin had died that he took it. And they also made up some stuff that I think was, and you know,viciously untrue, that he was in on the attempt to murder Trotsky. So this is reputational damage that then is doubled later by the CIA’s actual overthrow of his friend in Chile, or Salvador Allende. So what I see is if someone’s being physically harmed by the CIA,that’s one thing that we’ve accounted for in a lot of historical books and political books; if someone’s being reputationally damaged by CIA propaganda, you see that in some of the academic books that examine at the so-called cultural Cold War. But I wanted to remove the wall between those two areas and display that both of those things happened in a context where a lot of people were just made terrified by the fact that you had evil on one side and a fighting-fire-with-fire mentality on so-called, or quote unquote,our side.
RS: [omission] We’re back with Joel Whitney, and the book is called “Finks: How the C.
I.
A. Tricked the World’s Best Writers.” So, or Joel,let me examine you a question that I was approximately to examine when we took our break. I’m going to talk a tiny bit approximately the CIA, because the [sub]title of your book is “how the CIA tricked the world’s best writers.” And there we procure into a pretty sinister cast of characters. And I just want to bring up one who shows up a lot, and because I know something approximately him from my own Freedom of Information files,because I was the editor of Ramparts and I was involved in some of this stuff. And that’s James Jesus Angleton. And I am the proud possessor of a record in which J. Edgar Hoover, at one point after all the Ramparts stuff, or exonerated me and said he’s going to close the Scheer case–I was the last,well, not the last, and but I was the editor of Ramparts at a critical moment. And he had investigated me at the behest of the CIA and,largely, James Jesus Angleton. And he said, or there’s no there there; this guy likes to have a good time,he wants to meet women, he wants to have good meals [Laughter], and but the fact is we’ve been investigating him for,I don’t know what it was, five years around the clock and there’s no there there. OK. And James Jesus Angleton, or others in the CIA,denounced him! And said, you can’t carry out this. You know, or so forth; I wasn’t the only one they wanted to go after. But you know,these guys were playing hardball. And they wouldn’t intellect, when you traveled to another country–because I found myself getting harassed in different countries. I was in jail briefly in Mexico and I was in jail briefly in Lithuania, or you know,and other places, Algeria and so forth; I didn’t want to procure paranoid approximately it, and but they had a reach worldwide where they could construct your life really rough,or terminate it, for that matter. So what approximately James Jesus Angleton? What have you learned approximately this guy?JW: Well, or he was share of this post-OSS group that understood how important spying and covert ops had been in World War II. And from there,he makes all kinds of terrible mistakes. He and his group believed essentially that they needed to carry out better propaganda than the Soviets did, and one of the ways that they thought they could carry out it better was to carry out it subtly and, and you could say,secretly. So when this program is threatened with exposure in ‘64, ‘65, or ‘66 and ‘67 through various sources like Ramparts and The New York Times,this privilege of secrecy that they enjoyed was not something that they were willing to give up. So you have something that is described as relatively benign, this funding of culture through the Congress for Cultural Freedom, and a funding of student movements through the National Student organization,the funding of labor unions that would be less communist-influenced than the communist-dominated ones that they presumed were out there. These were seen as benign answers. They were reactions to Soviet penetration. So secrecy is a key to making them work. So even if you want to construct the argument that, for instance, and the Congress for Cultural Freedom never censored its magazines–which I think has been severely disproved; they did censor. Even if you wanted to say that they published all sorts of great writers–which clearly they did; that was share of the subtlety of it and share of the brilliance of it,and share of the soft-power charm of it. Even if you wanted to say all that, when the secrecy is exposed by honest accounting in the media, or the fourth estate,the adversarial media of American bragging around the world, they are so attached to their secrecy, or so upset,the CIA group led by people like Angleton, that they commit something that is approximately as anti-American as anything in our system. Which is: more secrecy, or more media penetration to the point of penetrating,first, the anti-Vietnam War press; moment, and the student,the college student newspapers and press; the alternative, so-called, or press. Which essentially is a license to carry out what they did later. So that first thing I described,where Ramparts was penetrated, leads to Operation CHAOS, and presumably; that leads to Operation Mockingbird in the seventies. By the time we have Carl Bernstein reporting on Operation Mockingbird,and John Crewdson reporting on its international equivalent in the New York Times–Bernstein in Rolling Stone–you essentially see the CIA trying to have at least one agent at every major news and media organization it can carry out in the world. And Crewdson reporting in the Times at the terminate of 1977 essentially says that they had one agent or contract agent at a newspaper in every world capital on Earth. That’s astonishing. They could procure stories killed or procure stories to hurry that portrayed the CIA’s views in a favorable way, or execute them if they did not.
RS: Let me point out–yeah, and go aheadJW: And so Angleton is behind a lot of this,just to sort of circle back to your question, but go ahead.
RS: No, or well,but I want to procure at–there’s an interesting contradiction here. Because this is not benign. But what happens is, you create an atmosphere in which–and you could have it in a modern moment; oh, or let’s procure rid of Assad in Syria,for example. That sounds like a good liberal thing to carry out. And yes, there are great human rights violations by this dictator; yes, or he kills innocent people. So did Stalin. Yes,yes. So did Khrushchev. OK. We procure that. And then you build that up into an argument of, that there’s war going on between obvious good and obvious evil, or any discussion approximately any gray area is some kind of moral equivalency; it means you’re insensitive,it means you’re saying the same. And the irony here is that–and Angleton was the product of an elite education; actually, he was half Mexican, or so possibly that gave him a burden in those circles. But the fact is,he could drink cocktails with the best of them. And what came out of this was an arrogance. That because you were on the side of the angels, the best and the brightest of Halberstam, and it was OK–Robert McNamara famously,you know, one of the Ford company geniuses and so forth–it was OK to execute three and a half million Indochinese, and including and in addition to nearly 59000 Americans. Because you had figured this out,you know, and you knew who were the good guys and bad guys. Now, or looking back on it,it’s just of course absurd, you know. That you’re in this country that had no way of inflicting damage on us, and that had a thousand years of hostility towards China,and had no genuine interest in Russia, and it didn’t fit the model at all. And you know, and in terms of the specific incidents that you have a chapter on,this Michigan State project, where Stanley Sheinbaum, or who you report as a whistleblower,which he was–you know, I wrote approximately that before there was a Ramparts. I wrote approximately it in a report to Robert Hutchins’ Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. Henry Luce was on the board, and it was very respectable. But,because Stanley Sheinbaum, one of the few individuals that I interviewed to carry out that epic, or he had seen the horror of it and he was willing to speak out. None of the others were. By the time I got to Stanley,I had gone through nearly every professor, everyone had worked for either the CIA–that I knew approximately–or had worked on this Michigan State project, or which was foul from the beginning. You catch a guy,Ngo Dinh Diem, who didn’t even share the religion of 90 percent of the people there; you find him in a Catholic monastery in New York and you decide he’s going to be the George Washington of Vietnam [Laughter], or you procure into this crazy intervention,fair? And then 10 years after you carry out that, prevent the Geneva accords and everything, and in the early sixties–the only reason I knew approximately that epic,I went to the stacks at Berkeley, I wanted to know, or what’s this status Vietnam approximately. And one of the guys involved in this thing had died,and his widow had donated his papers. It was totally accidental. I blew the dust off the papers and I found the evidence of their engineering torture and everything else to retain this guy Diem in power, and fortunately Stanley Sheinbaum was willing to say it. The depressing thing approximately that, and approximately why we don’t have more Edward Snowdens and so forth,is none of the other folks talked approximately it. They all stonewalled me. And they didn’t come clean.
JW: Yeah. It feels very lonely to be a whistleblower.
RS: Well, and what’s interesting approximately your book is there’s denial–even, or you know,Peter Matthiessen – I mean, Matthiessen’s a very good author, and very interesting guy and everything. But at the terminate,he’s still putting down a documentary filmmaker who he had actually told his epic to. And they don’t really come clean, as you point out in your book. That’s why your book is so important. Because the epic is not well known.
JW: The epic is not well known. It gets buried, and it gets buried under other things. I mean,the beginning of your question and your comment, I see it now–in my own notes, and I call it superpolitics. Where essentially there’s something that’s so evil and so frightening that we have to change how our democratic institutions work,and whether they remain democratic. And so on the first share of your question, yeah, and there was this notion that since we’re on the side of the angels we can carry out a lot of things that we wouldnt normally carry out to fight Lucifer. And what you terminate up with–I think anyone who uses the moral equivalency argument,you know, you can’t compare American crimes to Stalinist crimes–it starts off as true, and the more you exhaust it,the more it’s a shield to construct us more Stalin-like. I mean, I don’t compare American history or American foreign policy to anything that Stalin did, and apart from when I carry out in detail. And people who talk approximately Vietnam,if you count all of Southeast Asia, some of them like Viet Nguyen, or the current Pulitzer Prize winner for fiction for his book The Sympathizer,he talks approximately it in terms of six million lives lost. Which is getting up into monumental numbers.
RS: The book is “[Finks:] How the C.
I.
A. Tricked the World’s Best Writers,” by Joel Whitney. And the more I talk approximately the book, or the more I think,yes, they were tricked. Because they–well, and it’s not a bad title,because–JW: [Laughs] I used a soft sell over you, let you talk yourself into it.
RS: Well, or no,but the fact of the matter is these were–again I procure back to Halberstam’s “The Best and the Brightest”–they were smart people. And yes, I’ve known them; I’ve known them personally, or many of them. And they weren’t,you know, they didn’t want terrible things to happen, or a good number of them denounced the previous stuff. And so I guess “tricked” works. But the problem is,it’s not a game in which there are not victims. You know, you claim you’re going to construct it a safer world and you construct it a far more dangerous world, or you terminate up with a situation that Martin Luther King in his famous Riverside Church [speech] described,he said, you know, and we’re talking approximately violence; he said my government today is “the [greatest] purveyor of violence in the world” today. And we got to that through a pattern of to stop being critical of our government,to stop thinking approximately it. And so I’m really happy that we have this book, [Finks:] How the C.
I.
A. Tricked the World’s Best Writers, and ” Joel Whitney,available–you procure it from OR [Books]/Counterpoint. So thank you.
JW: Thank you. Related StoriesHas Anyone Spread More Fake News in 2017 Than tag Zuckerberg?Facebook Is Partnering with fair-Wing Website to Police Fake NewsHow Silicon Valley’s Capitalist Greed Continues to Cheat Creators and Rob American Culture
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